FAMILY LAW: COURT DETERMINES CHILD CONCEIVED
BY ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO BE ILLEGITIMATE
the gap between socio-scientific developments and the
law may not be altogether undesirable,' the recent case of Gursky v.
Gurshy2 is a graphic illustration of the bizarre result which may be
reached by the application of traditional legal concepts to modem
developments in medicine and sociology. In Gursky a New York
supreme court applied the words "out of wedlock" in a narrow sense
and concluded that a child conceived by artificial insemination with
the semen of a third party donor (A.I.D.)3 is illegitimate, regardless
of the written consent of the mother's husband. 4 The question

ALTHOUGH

whether a child conceived by this means is illegitimate is not merely
academic since every year a large number of births result from this

process. 5
In Gurshy, despite the birth of a child to the defendant wife,
evidence that the marriage had never been consummated was admitted to establish grounds for annulment. Plaintiff husband and
defendant wife had agreed to artificial insemination of the latter with
the semen of a third party donor, and the husband had been named
as the father on the birth certificate of the resultant child.6

I "The lag between medicine and law is not only inevitable but desirable. Too
often scientific theories and practices fail to fulfil their promise. Were medical discoveries immediately reflected in the law, we would have not progress but chaos.
Science with impunity may reverse itself repeatedly; the law, hardly ever." Tucker,
Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WOMEN LAw. J. 57, 58 (1947).
Index No. 3811/1962, Sup. Ct. Kings County, N.Y., Aug. 20, 1963.
s There are three techniques employed in the practice of artificial insemination.
A.I.D. is heterologous artificial insemination. This technique employs the semen of a
third party donor. A.I.H. is homologous artificial insemination which employs only
the semen of the husband. This practice is generally used where the husband is
impotent but not sterile. The process of mixing the sperm of the husband with that
of a third party donor is known as A.I.C. Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some
PracticalConsiderationsfor Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REV. 217, 222-23 (1961).
'Gursky v. Gursky, Index No. 3811/1962, Sup. Ct. Kings County, N.Y., Aug. 20, 1963.
Some authorities estimated that by 1957 there were as many as one hundred
thousand "test tube" babies in the United States. Gittinger, Artificial Insemination:
Its Place in Washington Law, 32 WASH. L. Rnv. 280 n.1 (1957).
Another authority states: "It is impossible to determine how many babies are
born annually in the United States as the result of donor insemination, but I would
estimate between five and seven thousand." Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial
Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15 OBSrETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY
767, 769 (1960).
1 Gursky v. Gursky, Index No. 3811/1962, Sup. Ct. Kings County, N.Y., Aug. 20, 1963.
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Although it does not appear from the report of the case for what
reason the court considered the question of legitimacy, this issue
received the greater part of the court's attention. The basis for
declaring the A.I.D. child illegitimate was found in the historical
concept that a child begotten by a father not the mother's husband
is illegitimate. 7 The court concluded that this concept was the
essence of the phrase "born out of lawful matrimony" as those words
are used in a New York statute defining legitimacy."
This intrusion of a third party donor into the marriage relationship has given rise to much legal uncertainty. 9 If the A.I.D. child
is declared illegitimate, he may find that since the laws regarding
intestate succession are generally based on blood relationship, 10 he
is not entitled to inherit from his mother's husband. Furthermore,
if a testator leaves property to the husband's "child" or "issue" and
these words are used in their technical sense, the child may be incapable of taking under the will."' This reasoning might permit
the A.I.D. child to inherit as the child or issue of the third party
donor,' 2 but since the identity of the donor is seldom, if ever, known
to the A.I.D. child or his mother, the value of such an allowance is
dubious.
The question of support for the illegitimate A.I.D. child caused
little difficulty in Gursky, where the court found the mother's husband liable for the child's support on the basis that the husband's
consent to the impregnation constituted an implied promise to
T

Ibid.

* "A child born out of wedlock is a child begotten and born: (a) Out of lawful
matrimony; (b) while the husband of its mother was separated from her a whole year

previous to its birth; or (c) during the separation of its mother from her husband
pursuant to a judgment of a competent court." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 119.
'There is a possibility that the practice of A.I.D. will result in criminal liability.

A list of possible offenses might include bastardy, criminal conversation, and lewdness.
In addition the doctor involved might give consideration as to whether an implied

warranty of fitness will attach to the semen that he selects, and depending upon how
the birth certificate is prepared, whether he might be liable for fraud and misrepresentation. Gittinger, supra note 5, at 283-90.
10

The New York statute regarding intestate succession declares: "If there be no

surviving spouse, and no children, and no representatives of a child, and no parent,

the whole shall descend and be distributed to the next of kin in equal degrees to the
deceased .... " N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAw § 83. "Next of kin" as employed in this statute
includes only blood relations. Matter of Waring, 275 N.Y. 6, 9 N.E.2d 754 (1937).
21 Comment, 28 IND. L.J. 620, 631 (1953).
12 However, this would seem to be unlikely since the child would probably be
considered the illegitimate child of the donor, and illegitimate children generally do
not take from the father under intestacy laws. See Matter of Vincent, 189 Misc. 449,
71 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Surr. Ct. 1947); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAw § 83 (13).
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support. It was indicated that the principles of equitable estoppel
could be applied for the same purpose. 8 Although finding such
liability is consistent with the general idea of applying equitable
estoppel against one whose voluntary act (in this instance, consent
to A.I.D.) is responsible for bringing the child into existence, 1 4 there
is always the danger that a court may find that an illegitimate A.I.D.
child is not entitled to the husband's support.
Where custody of the A.I.D. child is contested in a divorce hearing, courts probably will tend to favor the mother since her husband
is not related to the child by blood. 5 Although the welfare of the
child generally controls the determination of custody, the fact that
the husband is technically, at least, not a parent will strengthen the
mother's claim.' 6
Although there was no discussion of the question in Gursky, the
possibility that A.I.D. embodies adultery was considered in Orford
7 where the court, basing its reasoning on a
v. Orford1
definition of
adultery that did not require sexual intercourse for the commission
of that act,' 8 stated in dictum that the practice of A.I.D. does involve
adultery.
The conclusion reached by the court in Gursky was not inevita-

ble. The Sanitary Code of the City of New York 9 prescribes that a
"Gursky v. Gursky, Index No. 3811/1962, Sup. Ct. Kings County, N.Y., Aug. 20,
1963.
x, Comment, supra note 11, at 631.
'
20

Ibid.

"In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in
either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of
the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
accordingly." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 70; Sandfort v. Sandfort, 278 App. Div. 331, 105
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1951).
If the child is adjudicated illegitimate the mother will generally be entitled to
its custody. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare ex rel Stuart v. Chandler, 123 Misc. 201,
204 N.Y.S. 187 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922).
17 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).

18 "In my judgment, the essence of the offense of adultery consists, not in the moral
turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another
person of the reproductive powers or facilities of the guilty person; and any submission
of these powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other than the husband or
the wife comes within the definition of 'adultery'.... Sexual intercourse is adulterous
because in the case of the woman it involves the possibility of introducing into the
family of the husband a false strain of blood. Any act on the part of the wife which
does that would, therefore, be adulterous." Orford v. Orford, supra note 17, at 22-23,
58 D.L.R. at 258. Accord, Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S 14981, Super. Ct. Cook
County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954. But see Hoch v. Hoch, Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., 1945,
Time, Feb. 26, 1945, p. 58; Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
19 Naw YoRK, N.Y., SANITARY CoDE § 112.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1964:163

physician who practices artificial insemination must keep records
regarding his activities and also administer tests to both the donor
and the mother. The court in Gursky insisted that the existence of
20
such a law does not sanction the practice of artificial insemination.
However, the existence of the code encourages an orderly application of the technique and in so doing indicates at least a tacit ap.
proval of the process. Moreover, the court might have found a clear
precedent for declaring the legitimacy of the Gursky child in a New
York case 21 where an A.I.D. child, to whose conception the husband
22
had consented, was said to be legitimate.
The strongest argument in favor of finding A.I.D. children
legitimate is based on the public policy reflected in the evidentiary
presumption of legitimacy. If a child is born to a woman during
coverture, the law presumes that the offspring is the legitimate child
of the husband. 23 It is the general rule in New York that except in
affiliation proceedings neither parent may bastardize a child born
during marriage by testifying to non-access.2 4 In this presumption
and attendant rules of evidence the New York court might have
found a means for reaching a more desirable result.
The court in Gursky failed to follow the example set by Anonymous v. Anonymous 25 of subordinating technical considerations to
concern for the welfare of the child. In Anonymous, an action for
separation, the defendant wife, without making a claim of nonaccess or impotency, contended that her husband was not the father
of her child. The court found the child to be legitimate and concluded:
20 Gursky v. Gursky, Index No. 3811/1962, Sup. Ct. Kings County, N.Y., Aug. 20,
1963. Also, a provision in the city code would seem to be a questionable basis on
to interpret New York state domestic relations law.
which
21 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
22 "Indeed, logically and realistically, the situation is no different than that pertaining in the case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon
the marriage of the interested parties." Strnad v. Strnad, supra note 21, at 787, 78
N.Y.S.2d
at 392.
2
3 McConIIcK, EVIDENCE § 309
(1954). See Matter of Findley, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E.
471 (1930); Barker v. Barker, 172 App. Div. 244, 158 N.Y.S. 413 (1916).
21 Haynes v. Haynes, 43 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1943); ScHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY
PROCEEDINGS

142 (3d ed. 1953).

This limitation, known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, was originally stated as follows:
"[T]he law of England is clear that a declaration of a father or mother cannot be
admitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage. . . . [It is a rule founded on
decency, morality and policy that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage
that they have had no connection and therefore that the offspring is spurious." Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 592, 594, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777).
25208 Misc. 633, 143 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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[it is] the public policy of this State that a wife will not be permitted to
bring an action to declare that her husband is not the father of a child
born during lawful wedlock without proof of non-access or impotency
and will be denied relief even then in the absence of proof that it is for
the best interests of the child.26 (Emphasis added.)

Evidence of artificial insemination might have been excluded
in Gurshy even though the result would have been to deny relief to
the complaining party in an annulment proceeding. It is arguable,
however, that in a marriage where annulment would normally be in
order, the deliberate conception of a child by means of artificial
insemination is an action of such an affirmative nature that a later
27
plea for relief by annulment should be denied.
The presumption of legitimacy and a strict application of the
rules of evidence will not solve every problem arising as a result
of A.I.D. since these rules apply only to the husband and wife.
Neither will the principle of equitable estoppel, which might be
applied against a husband, apply to every person who might raise
the question of legitimacy. Where parties other than the husband
and wife have an interest in the question of legitimacy, as might
occur where relatives contest the A.I.D. child's right of inheritance,
the altered legal relationships make the doctrine inapplicable. It is
difficult to see, however, how such a situation could change the policy
considerations.
An examination that penetrates the common law definitions to
inspect the social rationale of the terms "adultery," "out of wedlock," and "illegitimate" clearly reveals that the undesirable factors
surrounding the common law transgressions are absent where conception is by means of artificial insemination. 2 The illegitimate
child born to a married woman is typically the product of adultery.
Where sexual intercourse is involved, adultery and the resulting
illegitimate child tend to break down the family unit by alienating
the wife's affections and by secretly creating an alien blood line in
the husband's family. Neither of these socially undesirable factors
"Id. at 637, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
- Some courts have held that an annulment proceeding may be barred by the
doctrine of laches. Lukaiser v. Lukaiser, 89 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Bentz v.
Bentz, 188 Misc. 86, 67 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1947). A statute of limitations has
also been held to bar an action for annulment based upon physical infirmity. Kronman
v. Kronman, 247 App. Div. 186, 286 N.Y.S. 627 (196); Deitch v. Deitch, 161 App.
Div. 492, 146 N.Y.S. 782 (1914).
218
Comment, supra note 11, at 624-27.
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is present where the child is the product of A.I.D. However, in
spite of the fact that society has a positive interest in finding children
legitimate, and in spite of the fact that the practice of A.I.D. incorporates none of the evils that the law associates with the conception
of offspring who are not the children of their mother's husband, it
seems unlikely that courts, bound by a rigid definitional approach,
will consistently categorize the A.I.D. child as legitimate.
The unfortunate result in Gursky might be rectified by relatively
simple legislation. 20 Ground rules which have been suggested for
the protection of the medical profession 0 might supply a basis for
such legislation. Apparently, however, no such legislation has yet
been passed either to legitimate A.I.D. offspring or to forbid the
practice altogether.3 1 It would seem advisable to incorporate in any
future legislation a requirement of the husband's consent, strict
medical supervision, a central system of record keeping to assure
that no inbreeding occurs inadvertently, and strict secrecy. The
most urgent need is for a provision as simple as the 1948 bill proposed in Virginia:
Children born as the result of artificial insemination shall be considered
the same as legitimate children for32 all purposes, if the husband of the
mother consented to the operation.
29 Catholic doctrine strongly opposes artificial insemination. See Kelly, Artificial
insemination: Theological and Natural Law Aspects, 33 U. DET. L.J. 135 (1955); Rice,

A..D.-An Heir to Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 510 (1959).

30 The rules include: "I. Donor must remain unknown to the husband and the wife.
2. All parties must voluntarily enter into the procedure. 3. Physicians must know
the couple well-their intellectual capacity, emotional stability, possibility of their
marriage being permanent. . . . 5. Husband, and not the biologic father, must be
listed on the birth certificate. 6. Signed papers should be kept to a minimum or
eliminated entirely." Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal
Aspects, 43 A.BA.J. 1089, 1090 (1957).
3 Hager, supra note 3, at 230.
32

Va. Sen. No. 199 (1948).

